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T he Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes sponsored
by the World Bank came into force on October 14, 1966. The Conven-
tion established a centre for the settlement of investment disputes be-
tween states and nationals of other states.' As of August 1, 1981, the con-
tracting states number 79.2 Provisions relating to ICSID have appeared in
the international agreements of 37 countries, and clauses relating to IC-
SID have appeared in the national investment laws of countries.3 How-
ever, only 11 cases have been registered before the centre, and 5 of these
were settled before a formal award was granted." The Latin American
* M.A., LL.B. (KRR) LL.M. (Harvard); Lecturer, Faculty of Accountancy and Business
Administration, National University of Singapore. The author aknowledges with gratitude,
the valuable assistance she received from Professor Arthur.yon Mehreh.
I Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 INT'rL LEGAL MATERAS 532
(1965) [hereinafter cited as ICSID Convention].
2 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SErTLmENT OF INVESTMENT DispTrrEs, FIrEENH ANNuAL
REPORT 5 (1981) [hereinafter cied as ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP.] Eighty-five states have signed
the Convention, but only 79 have ratified it. The six signatory states yet to ratify include
Australia, Barbados, Ethiopia, Israel, Paraguay, and the Solomon Islands. Id. at 5-6.
3 Id. at 19-28.
4 Id. at 30-43. Proceedings were discountinued in: Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum
v. Government of Morocco, (ARB/72/1) (discontinued Oct. 17, 1978); Alcoa Minerals of Ja-
maica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, (ARB/74/2)(discontinued Feb. 26-27, 1977); Kaiser
Bauxite Co. v. Government of Jamaica, (ARB/74/3)(discontinued Feb. 26-27, 1977); Reyn-
olds Jamaica Mines, Ltd. and Reynolds Metals Co. v. Government of Jamaica, (ARB/74/
4)(discontinued Oct. 12, 1977); Government of Gabon v. Soci6t6 SERETE S.A., (ARB/76/
1)(discontinued Feb. 27, 1978).
Alcoa Minerals, along with its two companion cases Kaiser Bauxite and Reynolds Ja-
maica, raised the issue of the Centre's jurisdiction. In all three cases the arbitral tribunal
upheld its jurisdiction over the dispute. For a thorough analysis of the jurisdictional issues
raised in Alcoa Minerals see Developments in International Commercial Arbitration -
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Gov-
ernment of Jamaica, 17 HARv. INTL L.J. 90 (1976).
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countries have, en bloc, refused to ratify the Convention.5 Countries like
Australia, Lebanon, India and Iran have shunned the Centre, despite hav-
ing participated actively in the preparatory meetings leading to the
Convention.
6
The Centre, it was hoped, would improve the investment climate in
the world, and help to facilitate the flow of funds from developed to de-
veloping countries.7 How well has the Centre played its role? Should it be
termed a success or a failure? The few facts that are well known about
ICSID are not enough to answer these questions. A deeper analysis seems
necessary before ICSID can be classified either as a success or a failure.
II. EVALUATING ICSID's RECORD
A starting point to this discussion is that only 11 cases have been
registered at the Centre in the past 16 years. Arguably this fact should be
to the Centre's credit. The rationale for this paradoxical conclusion is
that the presence of ICSID has a deterrent effect on potential disputes,
and operates to persuade parties to arrive at a settlement for fear that the
other party may take it to the Centre.8 Prima facie, it appears to be a
rather dubious argument but it does gain some credibility on further
thought.9
The two most recent cases, AMCO Asia Corp., Pan American Development Ltd. and
P.T. AMCO Indonesia v. Government of Indonesia, (ARB/81/1) and Kl6ckner Industrie-
Anlagen GmbH, Kl6ckner Belge, S.A. and Klachner Handelsmaatschappij B.V. v. United
Republic of Cameroon, (ARB/81/2), were registered with the Centre February 24, 1981 and
April 10, 1981 respectively.
5 See Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. IN' L.
256, 258 (1971); Amerasinghe, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes and Development Through the Multinational Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
793, 798 (1976). For further discussion of the Latin American position vis 6 vis ICSID see
infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
0 See ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 5-6; see generally, Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes, Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts (Bangkok, Apr. 27-May 1, 1964),
Summary Record of Proceedings (July 20, 1964), reprinted in 2 ICSID, ANALYSIS OF Docu-
MENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 458 [hereinafter
cited as HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION]
7 See Note by A. Broches, General Counsel, Transmitted to the Executive Directors:
"Settlement of Disputes Between Governments and Private Parties" (Aug. 28, 1961), re-
printed in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 1.
8 Also, the fact that five of the eleven cases have been settled prior to a final award
suggests that the Centre may have a deterrent effect. See supra note 4.
9 Cf. D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS:
PROMISES AS PROLOGUE 123 (1976). The authors argue:
[T]he mere presence of an arbitration mechanism may have assisted in the nonli-
tigious settlement of minor contract disputes. In many cases the awareness that
one aggrieved party might carry an unsettled issue to cumbersome arbitration pro-
ceedings has probably meant that both parties would attempt to avoid arbitration
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It can, of course, be argued that the ICSID clause was not the deter-
rent factor, and a mere agreement to arbitrate would have had the same
effect. This argument, however, would not be very forceful. A private in-
vestment contract, containing an arbitration clause referring to ICSID
would definitely be more effective than a general agreement to arbitrate,
since a breach of an obligation to arbitrate under the Convention is a
violation of an international treaty having serious repercussions at the
international level.10 Furthermore, no third world country (which is gen-
erally the state involved in such disputes) can afford to take such an obli-
gation lightly, once it has ratified the convention and consented to submit
the dispute to arbitration. Thus the statement cannot be dismissed per-
functorily, but nevertheless the question still remains: Is ICSID a
success?
The question seems simple and deserving of a straight-forward an-
swer. Yet this is not so. There are many extraneous factors that have to
be considered.
A. Foreign Investment Climate
The first relevant issue is whether investment by foreign nationals
continues to command the importance it did two decades ago. Many Afri-
can and Latin American countries find negative consequences in private
investment." They feel private investors make excessive profits without
reciprocal benefits to the state. They therefore attempt to have complete
control over the investment and regulate it stringently in order to elimi-
nate the exploitation of the national economy by the investors.12
The bargaining power between the parties has also changed. The pri-
vate investors, confronted by newly independent states aware of their ec-
onomic power, no longer dictate the investment terms in the same man-
ner as in the past. The see-saw is gradually changing its position and
especially in the case of extractive investments, the power to dictate
terms lies with the states.'3 Thus the climate for private investment is
very different from what it was when ICSID was conceived.
by settling their difficulties in a mutually agreeable way.
Id.
1" But see von Mehren & Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and
Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 537
(1981)(arguing that an arbitration agreement, whether tied to a treaty like ICSID or not, is
universally understood to imply that the parties will submit to the arbitration and recognize
the award as binding); see also Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, 42
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 24-29 (1967).
" See J. CHEmUAN, INVEsTMENT CoNTRAcTs AND ARBrTRATION 11-12 (1975).
12 Id.
Is See, e.g., Ball, The Relations of the Multinational Corporation to the "Host" State
in GLOBAL CoMPANmS 64, 66 (G. Ball ed. 1975).
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B. Arbitration on Investment Disputes
The second issue to be considered is how often do states and private
investors resort to arbitration as a method of dispute settlement? The
concepts of arbitration vary from place to place.14 The English Arbitra-
tion Act, until its latest amendment in 1979, insisted on judicial review
even in international arbitration. 5 The civil law concept of arbitration
does not allow judicial review except when it is against the accepted pub-
lic order.' 6 Common law countries generally follow the English tradition
and do not allow the arbitrators to decide as amiable compositeurs.17
Civil law gives the parties the freedom of choice. As one knowledgable
commentator has noted, attempts to unify arbitration law and practice
"have not succeeded and are not likely to succeed within a measurable
space of time."' 8
Though arbitration remains a widely used method of settling invest-
ment disputes, it still has many disadvantages. Among the more impor-
tant criticisms directed against arbitration, are the facts that it is both
time consuming and expensive. The parties would prefer a more expedi-
tious method of dispute settlement. The average period for an arbitration
to be completed under ICSID, either by a final award or by settlement
between the parties, is approximately three years.' 9 To the parties, and
especially to the investor, three years is a long period, particularly. in
cases where capital is paralyzed. Rather than freezing capital and submit-
ting the dispute to arbitration, foreign investors may agree to a less fa-
vourable settlement. Similarly, the excessive expenditure involved in arbi-
tration is another factor which pressures parties to arrive at an amicable
settlement.2 0 The arbitration clause will therefore be invariably included
1" For recent reports on arbitration practices around the world see the national reports
in the annual volumes of Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, published by International
Council for Commercial Arbitration, beginning with volume one in 1976. A more thorough,
yet somewhat dated survey of national arbitration practices appears in 1 P. SANDERS, INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1956).
"I Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Gao. 6, ch. 27, See Schmitthoff, The Supervisory Jurisdic-
tion of the English Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIMER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN
DOMKE 289 (P. Sanders ed. 1967). The current statute, Arbitration Act of 1979, severely
restricts judicial review of an arbitrator's award. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, reprinted in
18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1248 (1979); Smedresman, The Arbitration Act, 1979, 11 J. MAR.
L. & CoM. 319 (1980). The House of Lords recently endorsed the Parliamentary intent to
limit judicial review of arbitration awards. See Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd.
(The Nema), [1981] 2 All E.R. 1030 (H.L. 1981), reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERMLS
1105 (1981).
" See generally 1 P. SANDERS, supra note 14, at 19.
" See id. at 21.
's Id. at 11.
19 See ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 30-43.
20 See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 10, at 549.
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as a general safety device, but is resorted to by parties only when abso-
lutely necessary.
Moreover there is a tendency, more predominant in recent times, to
institutionalize in the contract itself mechanisms for change. Thus, the
scope for disputes is reduced to some extent.21 This is a realization of the
fact that the bargaining power of the parties changes as circumstances
change, and renegotiation of terms may become essential. Examples of
such mechanisms are: Progresssive reduction of the concession areas;
phase-in host country equity ownership; and Most-Favoured-Company
and Most-Favoured-Country clauses. 22 These provisions have also played
a role in reducing the number of disputes being referred to arbitration.
The disputes arising out of a spate of nationalizations, are now con-
siderably less. A 1975 State Department study showed that of the 56 for-
eign investment disputes instituted before 1971, but unresolved by 1973,
71% involved nationalization.23 Only 21 percent of disputes arising be-
tween 1971 and 1973 involved nationalization, and the remainder mainly
dealt with the host state's concern for a greater share in the earnings or
renegotiations.
2
Countries that continue to encourage private investment do so on the
basis that it is in their best interest. There is now an increased sense of
cooperation between the investor and the host state.2 5 The bargaining
powers are now often more equal. In the case of extractive investments,
greater bargaining power is in the hands of the host states.28Thus, the
suspicious and reluctant welcome accorded to investors by host states in
the past is gradually changing. The new trusting attitude also helps to
reduce the number of arbitral disputes by encouraging settlement in an
amicable manner.
Simpler methods are preferred (if the parties can arrive at an agree-
ment) to the laborious process of arbitration. The process adopted in
Lesotho's 1971 Maluti Diamond Agreement provided that disputes con-
cerning "any expenditure sought to be deducted" would be referred to an
appointed expert agreed upon by both parties, and the decision would be
21 See D. SMrrH & L. WELLS, supra note 9, at 126-40.
22 Id.; see also Smith & Wells, Conflict Avoidance in Concession Agreements, 17 H.Anv.
INT'L L. J. 51, 56-65 (1976).
23 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T STATE, DIsPUTES INVOLVING U.S.
FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT JULY 1, 1971-JuLy 31, 1973 at 2 (1974).
24 Id.; see also Salzman, How to Reduce and Manage the Political Risks of Investment
in Less Developed Countries in GLOBAL COMPANIES 91 (G. Ball ed. 1975).
25 Cf. Smith & Wells, supra note 22, at 69-70 (suggesting that foreign investors are
taking greater responsibility for the host country's development lest the host government
take the matter into his own hands through nationalization).
28 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 13, at 66.
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final and binding. 7 Although the question would not be as simple when
the dispute involves a more complex legal issue, it does illustrate the gen-
eral desire for a quick and effective remedy.
One major difficulty in an arbitration between a private investor and
a state seems to be the process of getting the latter to enforce an award
which is against its own interests.2 A spirit of consent is essential if arbi-
tration is to succeed as a method of dispute settlement. However, if this
spirit of cooperation forms the relationship, then it is highly probable
that the parties will arrive at a settlement rather than have their dispute
arbitrated. On the other hand, if the state has decided not to cooperate,
an award in favour of the investor is useless in the absence of an effective
award enforcement process. The only effect of such an award is that it
may be persuasive in eventually forcing the state to arrive at a settle-
ment. Thus, once again, the private investor would resort to arbitration
only as a last alternative, and on occasion, is even willing to settle for less
favourable terms rather than take the dispute to arbitration. Arbitration
is, therefore, regarded as a necessary evil since there is no other viable
solution acceptable both to the developed as well as the developing
countries.
With the general attitude toward private investment gradually
changing while attitudes toward arbitration remain stagnant, the percent-
age of disputes being submitted to arbitration may decrease. These fac-
tors must also be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion
about the success of ICSID.
C. Lack of Publicity
Another reason preventing the success of ICSID is that despite its
long existence, ICSID still remains poorly publicized. A survey of major
U.S. multinational corporations indicated that 15.8 percent of the respon-
dents were familiar with ICSID.29 The respondents stated that they had
little or no information about the Centre.s0 If this is the state of affairs,
then it is not surprising that only 11 cases have come before ICSID. The
27 D. SMrrH & L. WELLS, supra note 9, at 124 n.6 (quoting (Lesotho) Maluti Diamond
Agreement (May 6, 1971), Article 40).
28 See Schacter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1960); Mann, supra note 10, at 30-31; von Mehren & Kourides, supra note
10, at 537-38.
29 Baker & Ryans, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 65, 71 (1976). The authors surveyed the 1973 Fortune 1,000
largest corporations.
20 The Centre addressed the publicity problem in 1981, issuing a new information bro-
chure and holding a seminar in Paris entitled "ICSID: Principal Aspects of the Settlement
of Investment Disputes-The Point of View of the Users." ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP?., supra
note 2, at 3.
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fact that the awards are kept confidential also adds to the 'mystique' of
the institution.3 1 In the Adriano Gardella SpA v. Government of Ivory
Coast arbitration, the parties have refused to publish the award despite
the fact that the delegate of Ivory Cost has expressed his satisfaction at
the way the arbitrarion was conducted by ICSID.32Extensive publicity
and publication of the award would certainly help to convince potential
investors of the availability of an effective method of dispute settlement.
D. Provisions of the Convention Affecting ICSID's Success
In addition to these three extraneous reasons, there are also other
factors inherent in the convention rules which have probably contributed
to its poor performance.
1. Article 42 - Applicable Law
Despite the fact that the rules were framed by some of the best legal
minds in the world, they are sometimes vague and capable of being inter-
preted in various ways. This often leaves the parties in doubt as to the
effect of the rules. Furthermore, since awards are often unpublished,
there is no way for the parties to rely on precedents determining how
rules are applied and interpreted. A classic illustration of such vagueness
is one of the most important articles of the convention, Article 42. Article
42 states that in the absence of agreement between the parties as to the
applicable law, "the law of the Contrasting State party to the dispute and
such rules of international law as may be applicable" will apply.3 3 Is in-
ternational law to be applied whenever there is a conflict with the na-
tional laws? Is it to be applied when the national laws are silent on a
particular issue? Or can it be applied whenever the arbitrator believes it
is appropriate or applicable? The correct meaning can be fathomed by
reading the documents of the legal committee preparing for the conven-
tion. But should parties to a dispute be required to wade through prepar-
atory committee materials before they can conclude what the rules mean?
After completing this task, what guarantees that the arbitrators are
bound by the interpretation? In fact, just after the legal committee
adopted the final form of this article, Mr. Tsai, the Chinese delegate, sug-
gested that the wording may 6e slightly ambiguous and proposed an al-
-I The Convention provides that "[t]he Centre shall not publish the award without the
consent of the parties." ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 48(5).
"aSee ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP., supra note 1AA, at 33-34 (printing a chronology of the
arbitration); see also 2 J. WALTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBrTRAL PROCESS 253-54 n.38
(1979)(quoting Mr. Konan of the Ivory Coast to the effect that the ICSIDI award was com-
pletely satisfactory).
ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 42(1).
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teration.3' But he was overruled. Perhaps it was the only compromise ac-
ceptable to both sets of proponents, those who wished to include
international law and those against the idea. Whatever the reason for the
ambiguity, it definitely leaves the parties unsure as to what is the applica-
ble law.3 5
2. Article 25 - Jurisdiction
Another factor that increases the general vagueness in the convention
rules is the lack of definition of the term "investment". The Centre is to
be used specifically for disputes that arise directly out of an investment.36
What was the framers' intention in limiting the jurisdiction of the Centre
to disputes arising out of an "investment", and leaving the definition of
the term "investment" to differing interpretations? Is there a conflict in
the two attitudes? In the first draft of the convention, the dispute was
not limited to investment disputes. 7 The Rules were framed for the reso-
lution of disputes generally. Many delegates to the preliminary meetings
expressed the need for a limitation on this general statement." The
phrase "of a legal nature" was then added to clarify that commercial and
political disputes would be kept out of the Centre's jurisdiction.3 9 "Dis-
pute" was also qualified by the term "arising directly out of an invest-
ment".40 This was necessary to justify the connection to the World Bank.
;4 Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting 2-6 (Dec. 30, 1964), re-
printed in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 800-04; see also Memorandum of
the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole 3-5 (Feb. 25, 1965), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF
THE CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 984-86 (discussion of Article 42(1)).
3 Arons Broches, the first Secretary General of the Centre, argues that article 42(1)
clearly provides that international law may be applied in specific situations. Broches, The
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States: Applicable Law and Default Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: Li-
BER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 12, 17 (P. Sanders ed. 1967); see also Broches, The Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, [1972] 2 RECUEEL DES CoURs 331, 387-395.
8' ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
8 The Convention draft, dated June 5, 1962 provided that the Centre's jurisdiction
would be limited to "disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Con-
tracting States .... "Working Paper in the Form of a Draft Convention (June 5, 1962), at
13, reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION, supr a note 6, at 19, 33.
" See generally Memorandum of the Meeting of the committee of the Whole (Dec. 18,
1962), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 53.
39 Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States (Oct. 15, 1963), art. 11(1), Comment 4, reprinted
in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 202-04; see also Broches, The Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
[1972] 2 RECUEIL DES Cous at 362-64. The final Convention limits the Centre's jurisdiction
to "legal dispute[s]". ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
'1 Revised Draft of Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
Vol. 14:591
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At the outset, the Centre was to have an administrative link to the Bank.
After the qualifying terms were incorporated in a later draft, the adminis-
trative link to the Bank was discarded due to the vehement protest of
many states who felt that if the connection was maintained, there might
have been indirect pressure on them from the Bank to join the Centre. 1
Once this was dropped it was perhaps impossible to arrive at a consensus
to do away with the investment qualification, on the grounds that the link
being no more, it was not necessary to define the term 'dispute'.
The term investment was undefined for two main reasons. First, de-
fining the term would limit the scope of the convention and simultane-
ously raise unnecessary jurisdictional problems. 2 Second, the freedom is
given to the parties to define the term investment in every contract which
includes an arbitration clause. Thus if the states desire to define the
term, they are free to do so individually. However, an attempt was made
to define the term, but it was impossible to arrive at a consensus.
Therefore when the convention was conceived there was no conflict.
The term 'dispute' was unqualified and there was no question then of
defining any qualifying term. But later due to pressure from the states,
the term 'dispute' was restricted, and the word 'investment' was left un-
defined because it was impossible to arrive at an acceptable definition
and it was not inconsistent with the thinking of the directors. Although
there appears to be a conflict in restricting the definition of dispute and
leaving the meaning of investment open, it is a tremendous effort to
please the member states in the hope that they will be persuaded to join
the ICSID. Whatever the reason, the net result is that the parties are left
in doubt as to the exact meaning of the term and they must take the
trouble to define the term themselves. In such situations, the party with
the higher bargaining power will succeed. This also defeats the purpose of
the convention which is to give the parties a dispute settlement process
where they would have equality. A better alternative would be to define
the term, or at least to specify transactions that would definitely be out of
States and Nationals of Other States (Dec. 11, 1964), at art. 25(1), reprinted in 2 HISTORY
OF THE CONVENMON, supra note 6; at 911, 918.
41 Article 67 provides that the Convention
shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank. It shall also
be open for signature on behalf of any other State which is a party to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice and which the Administrative Council, by a
vote of two-thirds of its members, shall have invited to sign the Convention.
ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 67.
42 See Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 9 (March 18, 1965), re-
printed in 2 HISToRY OF THE CONVWNION 1069, 1078; Broches, The Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, [1972] 2
REcuEU. DES CouRs at 362.
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the Centre's jurisdiction. Even a staff member of the World Bank is not
certain, for example, if ordinary sales involving substantial supplier cred-
its constitute an investment.4 It would be advisable for the Centre to
publish some guidelines to clarify the term 'investment' for arbitrators
when deciding jurisdiction.
e. Article 26-Exhaustion or Alternative Remedies
Another point that is left to the discretion of the arbitrators is the
clause in Article 26 which states that the contracting state may require,
as a precondition to arbitration, that the private investor exhaust local
administrative and judicial remedies.44 There is nothing, however, on
what effect this will have on the arbitration. Will the arbitration then be
a review of the fairness of the process, or will it totally ignore the process
if the investor is not satisfied with it? Questions like this will necessarily
be asked by both the investor and the state. They are left totally unan-
swered since maximum freedom of choice is to be given to the parties.
The main reason for giving the parties such immense freedom is that
without this feature the states would never have agreed to join the
convention.'
5
An issue worthy of consideration is whether it was essential to sacri-
fice the clarity of the convention for the sake of added membership. Ini-
tially, it was hoped that the Latin American countries would join the IC-
SID. But despite all the concessions made, they have kept away en bloc
and still show no sign of ratifying the convention. 6 Countries like India,
Lebanon, Spain, Australia, and most of the oil-producing countries have
also remained aloof.47 From a superficial analysis it appears that countries
which have a better bargaining position have chosen not to ratify the con-
vention. Thus it would have been better to insist on maintaining the clar-
ity of rules rather than trying to please every state. Those countries
which were genuinely interested in encouraging foreign private invest-
ment still would have joined.
Consent, as an underlying factor of the convention, has been hailed
43 Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1968).
44 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 26.
4' See, e.g., Memorandum of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole 1-2, para. 6
(Dec. 27, 1962) (Statement of Mr. llanes), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION, supra
note 1D, at 61-62; Memorandum of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole 3-4, para.
12 (May 28, 1963)(Statement of Mr. Chen), reprinted in 2 HIsToRY OF THE CONVENTION,
supra note 6, at 88-89.
41 See Szasz, supra note 5, at 258.




as the strongest point of the rules.4 But this factor seems to have been
exaggerated to induce the states into joining ICSID. As a result, too much
flexibility has defeated the purpose of the Centre in providing an efficient
dispute settlement process.
4. Articles 53-55 - Enforcement of Awards
Another section of the convention which has been much discussed
and praised is the enforcement section."' This section is definitely pro-
gressive and significant since it evidences a tendency towards cooperation
in international law, and a gradual willingness to accept limitations on
the doctrine of sovereignty. There is, however, a great deal of difference
between idealistic jurisprudence and practical rules. The enforcement
proceedings have not been tried on the touchstone of reality.50 Awards
have been given in only four cases, and little is known about these
awards. 51
The enforcement provisions would be more effective if the deterrent
factors were stronger. ICSID being a prot~g6 of the World Bank should
have been able to utilize the Bank's influence. But again this was not
possible. An administrative link with the Bank was vehemently protested
against, and necessarily deleted.52 The most vehement protest came from
India which later did not ratify the convention.5" ICSID is the only arbi-
4' The Report of the Executive Directors which accompanied the final Convention as-
serts that "[c]onsent of the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre."
Report of the Executive Directors in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of other States 8, para. 23 (Mar. 18, 1965), reprinted in
2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 1069, 1077.
49 As of August 1, 1981, India still is not a signatory to the Convention. ICSID, 15TH
ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 5.
50 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 877 (No. 4, July 1981); Judgment of Cour
d'Appel, Paris - This judgment, concerning the recognition and enforcement of an award
in the context of ICSID, reveals the advantages of an ICSID award.
"1 Awards have been granted in the following four cases: Adriano Gardella SpA v. Gov-
ernment of Ivory Coast, (ARB/74/1)(award rendered Aug. 29, 1977, corrected Oct. 13, 1977);
AGIP SpA v. Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, (ARB/77/1)(award ren-
dered Nov. 30, 1979); Soci6t6 Ltd. Benvenuti & Bonfant Srl v. Government of the People's
Republic of the Congo, (ARB/77/2)(award rendered Aug. 7-8, 1980); Guadalupe Gas Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Federal Military Government of Nigeria, (ARB/78/1)(award embodying the
parties' settlement rendered July 22, 1980). None of the awards had been published at this
writing. However, at the time of publication, the awards of AGIF, SpA and Benvenuti &
Bonfant appear in 21 INT'L LEGAL M EAELs 726, 740 (No. 4, July 1982).
12 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 67. For text of Article 67 see supra note
41.
"' ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 53-55. For a discussion of the enforcement
provisions of the Convention see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, [1972] 2 REcumI DES CoURS at
396-405; Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protections and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L
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tral institution with the advantage of having the World Bank as its godfa-
ther. It would have been difficult to arrive at a consensus on what role the
Bank would play, but it would have been possible as in the case of the
enforcement articles. Although this would not have cured the whole prob-
lem, it would have a greater deterrent effect than any other provision.
III. ICSID IN THE THIRD WORLD
Another factor contributing to the paucity of cases and to the general
lack of efficacy of the Centre is that many important capital importing
States have refused to join the Centre.
A. Latin America
None of the Latin American countries have ratified the convention."
This is significant since a 1974 American State Department study showed
that of the 143 foreign investment disputes registered between July, 1971
and July, 1973, 69 percent (84) were in Latin America. 55
The basis of the Latin American countries' objection to the conven-
tion is the 'Calvo Clause'." The doctrine underlying the clause expounds
the theory that no state should intervene in any way whatsoever in the
affairs of another state. 7 This was the consequence of years of exploita-
tion and intervention by colonialist states in the affairs of the third world
nations.5 8 It forbids any foreign state from interfering in the affairs of the
Latin American states on the pretext of protecting its nationals. The doc-
trine also states that aliens should be given the same status as citizens.59
It is evident that the purpose of the Convention, which is to provide
a special centre for arbitration between states and aliens, is antithetical to
the main philosophy of the Calvo Clause; it gives foreign investors a legal
status different from that of the investors of the same nationality.
& Com. L. 343, 357-60 (1974); West, Award Enforcement Provisions of the World Bank
Convention, 23 Arb. J. (n.s.) 38 (1968).
" See Press Release No. 57 (Sept. 9, 1964) (Statement of Felix Ruiz, Governor for
Chile), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CoNVENTIoN, supra note 6, at 606.
BuREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 23, at 1.
"See Szasz, supra note IC, at 260-63; Developments in International Commercial Ar-
bitration - Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of
Non-Ratification, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 131, 139, (1976). For the suggestion that the Latin
American resistance to arbitration of investment disputes may be weakening, see Aksen,
Commercial Arbitration with Latin America: A Practical Assessment in REFERENCE MAN-
UAL ON DOING BusiNEss IN LATIN AmERICA 112 (1979).
57 Note, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual Renunciation of Dip-
lomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT'L L.F. 289, 289 n.2 (19.) (citing C. CALVO, INTERNACIONAL
TEomco Y PRAc rco 22 (1868)).
"Id. at 289.
59 Id. at 290.
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The Calvo Clause lives on, for in December 1970, the Andean Foreign
Investment Code was adopted by Chile, Peru, Columbia, Equador and
Bolivia.60 Article 51 of-the Code states:
No investment relating to investment or transfers of technology may
contain any provision which would remove potential conflicts or contro-
versies from the national jurisdiction and competence of the receiving
country or which would permit a state to be subjugated to the rights and
causes of action of its nationals who are investors.61
Argentina has also separately incorporated this as law.62 The Venenzu-
alian Constitution contains an article to the same effect.63
An argument against the position of Latin American countries is
that, '[w]hile an agreement by a State to submit to international arbitra-
tion admittedly implied some limitation of national sovereignty, one of
the essential attributes of sovereignty was the capacity to accept limita-
tions on it, which is what happened whenever a state entered into an in-
ternational agreement.'" Latin American suspicion of the Centre seems
unfounded, and there is no means of meeting their objections without de-
tracting from the basic purpose for which ICSID was created.
B. Libya - A Hypothetical Analysis
Libya is another country which has chosen not to ratify the conven-
tion.65 This is in conformity with the other oil-producing countries of the
Middle East and probably the decision owes itself to their relatively
40 Andean Foreign Investment Code, done Dec. 30, 1970, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERm.S 126 (1971). For commentary on the Code see Daflino, The Andean Code After
Five Years, 8 LAw. AM. 635 (1976); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New
Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. Ir'L L.
763 (1972). For a thorough review of Latin American law regarding foreign investment dis-
putes see Wesley, The Procedural Malaise of Foreign Investment Disputes in Latin
America: From Local Tribunals to Factfinding, 7 LAw & POL'Y INT'L *Bus. 813 (1975) and
Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes
in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978).
'4 Adean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 60, at art. 51.
"Foreign Investments Law, art. 1 (Aug. 13, 1976), reprinted in 15 INr'L LEGAL MATER-
ILS 1364, 1367 (1976). The article provides that "[foreign investors ... shall have the
same rights and obligations that the Constitutions and laws grant to national investors
.... "Id. For a discussion of the scope of the law see McKinnis, The Argentine Foreign
Investment Law of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357 (1978).
'3 Constituci6n art. 127 (Venez.), reprinted in 4 A. PEAsLEE, CONSTTrruTONS OF NATIoNs
1309 (rev. 3d ed. 1970).
' Settlement of Investment Disputes, Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts (Santi-
ago, Feb. 3-7, 1964), Summary Record of Proceedings 4 (June 12, 1964), (Statement of Mr.
Broches, Chairman), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 298, 303.
"As of August 1, 1981 Libya has not signed the Convention. ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP.,
supra note 2, at 6.
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higher bargaining powers. Libya's reasons for not joining ICSID cannot
be fathomed from the documents of the preparatory meeting of African
nations held in Addis Ababa since the only comment of the two Libyan
delegates was an opening remark that Libya would cooperate.66 The rea-
son, therefore, for its non-ratification of the convention must be found
elsewhere. An interesting study in this case would be to consider the ad
hoc arbitration between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO)
and Libyae 7 and hypothesize what the result would have been had the
dispute been brought to the Centre.
In the arbitration between TOPCO and Libya, Libya claimed that
there was neither any dispute nor any breach of contract between the
Minister of Petroleum, and the company.68 Libya therefore refused to
participate in the arbitration, except for a memorandum submitted to the
President of the International Court of Justice.6 9 According to the provi-
sions.of the contract if the parties could not agree on the constitution of a
tribunal, the dispute would be appointed by the President of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice."0 The company thus took the matter to the Court,
and the President appointed Professor Ren6-Jean Depuy as the sole arbi-
trator. The arbitrator then proceeded to determine the dispute, and the
final award was given on January 19, 1977.71 The arbitrator held Libya in
breach of contract and ordered the state to perform its obligation under
the agreement.7 2
Assuming arguendo, that Libya had ratified the convention and that
"Settlement of Investment Disputes, Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts (Addis
Ababa, Dec. 16-20, 1963), Summary Recors of Proceedings 9 (Apr. 30, 1964)(Statement of
Mr. Lamin), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 236, 247.
'7 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 393 (1979) (Depuy, Arb.)(Preliminary Award), 53
I.L.R. 389, 422 (1979)(Depuy, Arb.)(Award on the Merits), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TOPCO].
Robert von Mehren and P. Nicholas Kourides, counsel for TOPCO in the arbitration,
have written the definitive article on the TOPCO arbitration. See von Mehren & Kourides,
supra note 10; see also Casenote, Petroleum Concessions in International Arbitration, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257 (1979); Lalive, Un Grand Arbitrage Pgtrolier entre un
Gouvernement et Deux Socigt~s Privges Etrangares, 104 J. DU DRorr INT'L 319 (1977).
" 53 I.L.R. at 415-16 (Preliminary Award).
4, The Memorandum of the Libyan Government accompanied a letter dated July 26,
1974 sent by the Libyan Government to the President of the International Court of Justice.
See 53 I.L.R. at 415-19 (Preliminary Award)(discussing the various arguments raised in the
Libyan Memorandum); see also von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 10, at 489; Casenote
supra note 67, at 263.
70 G Deeds of Concession, cl. 28(3), reprinted in 53 I.L.R. at 403 (Preliminary Award)
and von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 10, at 481.
71 53 I.L.R. 422, 511 (Depuy, Arb.) (Award on the Merits), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERiALs 1 (1978).
72 Id. at 511.
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the concession had contained the necessary arbitration clause, let us try
to evaluate whether the award would have been significantly different.
Libya would have denied the centre jurisdiction on the grounds that there
was no dispute. However, under the ICSID rules a party cannot frustrate
arbitral proceedings once consent is given.73 Therefore, like in the
TOPCO award, the arbitration would have gone on.
The makeup of the ICSID tribunal has changed many times. ICSID
rules provide that in the case of a disagreement or inability to nominate
the arbitrators, either of the parties may request the Chairman of ICSID
to nominate the arbitrator.74 In this case since the parties could not have
agreed upon the nomination of the sole arbitrator, the Chairman would
have been requested to form the tribunal by the Company. In the event
of disagreement, ICSID provides for a three-man tribunal. 5 There
TOPCO would have chosen its arbitrator. Libya would have been in-
formed of their choice and if Libya still refused to nominate an arbitrator
within 90 days after the dispatch of the notice of registration of the re-
quest, then the Chairman would nominate the arbitrator for Libya.78
It is therefore possible that Libya would have had some advanage
under ICSID rules. Instead of a sole arbitrator rendering the award, the
ICSID award would have been the result of the collective wisdom of the
three arbitrators, among whom would have been included a member from
the third world. When one compares the radically different reasonings
and conclusions of the two sole arbitrators in the TOPCO and the British
Petroleum cases, the impact of a broader representation on the tribunal is
clearly foreseeable." In both cases the facts were identical. Yet one issue
7 The Convention provides that once consent is given "no party may withdraw its con-
sent unilaterally" ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
74 Id. at art. 38.
75 Id. at art. 37(2)(b).
76 Id. at art. 38. This scenario was played out in the Alcoa Minerals arbitration before
the Centre. Alcoa Minerals chose Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht who later resigned and was re-
placed by Sir Michael Kerr. The Government of Jamaica failed to nominate an arbitrator,
and the Chairman nominated Mr. Fuad Rouhani of Iran to represent Jamaica and Mr. Jor-
gen Trolle as the President of the tripartite board. See ICSID, 15TH ANN. REp., supra note
2, at 34-35. Mr. Trolle is currently the President of the new Danish Arbitration Center. See
Pedersen, International Arbitration in Denmark, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 259
(1982)(outlining the development and procedures of the Danish international arabitration
center).
77 Compare TOPCO, 53 I.L.R. 393 (Depuy, Arb.) (Preliminary Award) and TOPCO, 53
I.L.R. 422 (Depuy, Arb.)(Award on the Merits), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1
WITH BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53
I.L.R. 297 (1979)(Lagergren, Arb.)(Award on the Merits) [hereinafter cited as BP] For a
graphic comparison of these two apparently identical cases see van de Berg, Comparative
Table TOPCO v. LIBYA AND BP v. Libya, 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161 (1980)(International
Council for Commercial Arbitration).
It has been suggested that the disparate results in TOPCO and BP may be attributed,
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discussed by the two arbitrators clearly illustrates the point. Both the
companies requested the arbitrators to order the states to perform their
obligations under the contract.7 8 Mr. Depuy in the TOPCO arbitration
decided that restritutio integrum would be the principal remedy in that
case. 7 9 He found that it was a principle in Libyan law supported by inter-
national law and practice. In support of the latter proposition he men-
tioned the Chorzow case, the Mavrommatis-case, the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. cause, and the Barcelona Traction case. 0
In the British-Petroleum (BP) case the arbitrator found that restitu-
tio in integrum was not available as a remedy.81 He determined that
under Libyan law no conclusive opinion could be formed since the argu-
ment presented by the claimant was not sufficient to warrant such an
opinion. But the surprising departure from Mr. Depuy's reasonings occurs
when the arbitrator discusses the standing of the remedy under interna-
tional law. He refers to most of the cases mentioned in the TOPCO case,
and concludes that in none of these cases was such a remedy awarded.
8 2
As a result, he concluded that restitutio in integrum was not supported
by international case law and practice, and the only remedy available was
damages. 8 Similarly Mr. Depuy decided in the TOPCO arbitration that
despite the nationalization by Libya, the concession still remained bind-
ing on the parties.8 4 The arbitrator in the BP case felt that nationaliza-
tion terminates the concession.8 5 In an ICSID tribunal, the fact that there
would be three arbitrators could have been in Libya's favour.
Similarly in the TOPCO arbitration Mr. Depuy does not discuss the
effect of Libya's default. The ICSID Convention on the other hand specif-
ically provides that the "failure of a party to appear or to present his case
shall not be deemed an admission of the other party's assertions."' This
is the only 'Jus co ans' of the Centre's rules and cannot be altered even by
the parties' agreement.8 7
As far as procedural rules and applicable substantive law are con-
at least partially, to the differing modes of issue presentation adopted by counsel in each
case. See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 10, at 490.
"a TOPCO, 53 I.L.R. at 437; BP I.L.R. at 323.
7 TOPCO, 53 I.L.R. at 507-08.
so See id. at 497-501. The arbitrator also found support for restitution in integrum in
the writings of international legal scholars. Id. at 501-07.
61 BP, 53 I.L.R. at 348.
62 Id. at 334-48.
8 Id. at 355.
64 TOPCO, 53 I.L.R. at 462.
65 BP, 53 I.L.R. at 354.
8 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 45(1).
8' The use of the imperative "shall not" and the lack of the ubiquitous phrase "except




cerned, Libya would have been in a similar position even under the IC-
SID rules. In the case of the procedural rules, ICSID arbitrators also have
the power to decide any procedural issue not covered by the convention
rules.'8 Hence it is most likely that the ICSID tribunal would have fol-
lowed a similar procedure where the convention rules were silent. In the
area of applicable law, the agreement of the parties would be honoured in
both the tribunals.
A difference could have arisen in the provisions of the award. It is
likely that an ICSID tribunal would only grant monetary damages. It is
equally likely that the counsel for TOPCO would have only asked for
damages and not restitutio in integrum, since the Convention has a spe-
cific provision to enforce the pecuniary obligations of an award which are
binding on every state.8 9
Furthermore, even if the award was limited to monetary damages,
Libya would have refused to comply with the award on the ground that
the ICSID rules provide the doctrine of 'sovereignty' as a defence against
execution.90 In this respect, Libya would have been at a greater disadvan-
tage since such a refusal would be considered a breach of treaty obliga-
tions, and Libya could not have disregarded the ICSID award with the
same impunity as it did in the TOPCO award.91
Thus in an ICSID tribunal, the only way Libya's interests woud have
been better protected is that there would have been a three-man tribunal
which may have involved more discussion among the arbitrators before
the award was given. But from Libya's point of view, this must be an
acceptable sacrifice to avoid the binding obligations of the enforcement
provisions of the convention. The enforcement provisions appear to be
the factors which keep Libya from joining the ICSID.
C. Summary
A general analysis of the viewpoints of the various countries dis-
cussed, and others like Spain, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia supports three
basic conclusions:
1. Most capital-importing states which have chosen to keep away from
ICSID seem to be countries with superior bargaining powers in relation
to private investors.
2. The countries are aware that ICSID membership may enhance their
status in the eyes of private investors, but know that they have resources
" ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 44.
8O ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 54.
90 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 55. See Report of the Executive Directors,
supra note 41, at 1083.
9' Libya and TOPCO reached a post-award settlement on September 25, 1977. See von
Mehren & Kourides, supra note 10, at 546 n.274 (and authorities cited therein).
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
like oil and minerals which induce investors to do business with them
even though they have not ratified the convention; and
3. Since joining ICSID is not essential for economic reasons, these coun-
tries will not join the Centre and take on burdensome obligations which
they will then be compelled to fulfill.
To these third world countries, ICSID is a superfluous institution
which they do not really need, and therefore, modifying ICSID rules in an
attempt to persuade them to ratify the convention may be an exercise in
futility. But the omission of these countries, as well as others, has pro-
duced a dilution of the Centre's potential.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ICSID
The Centre has definitely not failed. It has made slow and gradual
progress. It was the unfounded optimism of the Bank Directors that
paved the way for the feeling that the Centre has been a failure. Though
ICSID started to function in 1966, the first dispute was registered in
1972,92 the next in 1974.93 Since then nine disputes have been registered
in the last seven years."' With more publicity and a few more satisfactory
awards like the one in the dispute involving the Ivory Coast, more confi-
dence will be engendered in the process.
A. Conciliation
One more point is relevant. Is there an alternative to the Centre?
Would the Centre have been more successful if it had been created only
as an institution for conciliation? Thus far there have been no disputes
brought to the Centre for conciliation. Since the Centre is primarily for
arbitration, it is rarely thought of as a center for conciliation. A concilia-
tion centre would definitely have had a larger membership, because the
controversial points, like the applicable law and the enforcement proceed-
ings would have been absent. 5 There would have been more recourse to
92 Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Government of Morocco, (ARB/72/1) was reg-
istered January 13, 1972. ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP. 30 (1981).
's Adriano Gardella SpA v. Government of Ivory Coast, (ARB/74/1) was registered
March 6, 1974. ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP. 33 (1981).
9 See ICSID, 15TH ANN. REP. 30-43 (giving a complete chronology of the disputes regis-
tered with the Centre as of June 30, 1981).
.. Conciliation procedures under ICSID aim at achieving "agreement between [the par-
ties] upon mutually acceptable terms." ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34(1).
Choice of law questions are irrelevant to the conciliation process and furthermore, the par-
ties are not bound by the settlement terms reached by the Conciliation Commission. As one
commentator has noted, "Conciliators may recommend, arbitrators must decide. The Con-
vention imposes a duty on parties to conciliation proceedings to 'give their most serious
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the Centre, for the dispute-settlement process of conciliation not binding.
In statistical terms, the Centre would definitely have been more success-
ful, but the question would arise whether the purpose of the Bank would
have been fulfilled by a mere conciliation Centre.
The purpose of the Centre is to improve the investment climate and
to encourage private investment by giving investors an efficient and effec-
tive Centre to bring their disputes.96 Would a conciliation Centre have
effected this purpose? Arguably not. A conciliation, can by definition, be
conducted if both parties take part in the entire procedure. The process
cannot go forward without the cooperation of the state from the begin-
ning to the end since the decision must be acceptable to both parties. In
the three arbitral disputes with Jamaica that were brought to the Centre,
conciliation would not have been possible in any of them because Jamaica
refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Centre.97 Thus a conciliation
Centre would not provide the guarantee that an Arbitration Centre pro-
vides, and therefore the purpose of the directors would not be fulfilled by
such institution.
B. Insurance
Another alternative to the Centre is an international insurance
agency.98 This would give the private investors the necessary guarantee
that they would not lose the invested money as a result of the unilateral
actions of the state. In turn private investors would be encouraged to in-
vest more in developing countries. The purpose of the Bank would be
satisfied here. An international insurance agency unlike the arbitration
Centre, would be much more expensive, and the states would be unwilling
to bear any expenses on this account. In arbitration, the cost of ap-
pointing and the fees paid to the arbitrators or conciliators is borne by
the respective parties, and the cost accruing to the Centre is very slight.9 9
Moreover this type of an institution would not help to improve the in-
vestment climate but only guarantee the losses to the investors. Thus this
consideration to [the Conciliation Commission's] recommendations' (Article 34), while par-
ties to arbitration proceedings 'shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award"
(Article 53(1))." Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, [1972] 2 RECUEIL DES CouPS at 337.
"See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 4 and authorities cited therein.
9S The structure and role of such an investment insurance agency, though beyond the
scope of this article, are deserving of further study. The Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration (OPIC) may provide an interesting model for such an international insurance agency.
See D. SMITH & L. WELLS, supra note 9, at 143. For a recent discussion of OPIC see Lip-
man, Overseas Private Investment Corporations Current Authority and Program, 5 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 337 (1980).
" See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 59-61.
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also would not serve the primary purpose for which the Centre was
instituted.
V. CONCLUSION
1. The advantages that ICSID rules hold for the private investor as
well as the state should be publicised in a better manner, so that there is
no paucity of materials about ICSID.
2. ICSID should propose a few amendments to the convention rules:
(a) to reduce the vagueness of the rules;
(b) to reduce the lengthy and complicated procedure to be followed in
each dispute;
(c) to cutdown the amount of freedom that is given to the parties, espe-
cially to create proper and acceptable procedural rules so that the free-
dom given to the parties to form their own procedural rules may be
deleted.
3. Provisions allowing each dispute to be arbitrated where it arises
should be incorporated. The same rules may be maintained, but a change
of this type would not only help to cut down the expenses for the parties
involved, but would also increase the confidence the states would have in
the dispute-settlement process. It would not affect the Convention in any
other way but at the same time it may act as an incentive for non-mem-
bers to ratify the Convention. Most of the state-members would have na-
tional arbitration centres and arrangements could be made with these in-
stitutions to make use of their facilities.
4. It would be beneficial if the Administrative Council arrived at a
consensus as to the influence that the Bank could exert on its members in
forcing them to enforce an award against themselves, at least with respect
to the pecuniary obligations.
5. The Centre should be thrown open to disputes between parties
even if the state party is a non-ratifier of the convention. (This has to be
limited to the state party, because in the case of the private investor, it
will be difficult to get his state to accept the enforcement obligations on
his behalf). Once the state consents to the arbitration, the Convention
should be regarded as binding on it, in the particular dispute to which
consent has been given. The Administrative Council should also consider
the possibility of widening the jurisdiction to legal disputes other than
those rising directly out of an investment. The Additional Facility Rules,
recently introduced, allow the use of the Centre's facilities to parties or
disputes falling outside the Centre's jurisdiction, but do not bind the par-
ties to follow the Centre's rules.10 0
100 ICSID Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceed-
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These are some of the changes that can be made to the present form.
It may take some time before the Administrative Council can arrive at a
consensus, but nevertheless it would definitely be worth pursuing.
The time to give up hope is not yet here. In international law, history
will attest to the fact that 15 years is not long enough for a new idea to be
accepted. ICSID is far from perfect, but it is certainly a big step forward
in enhancing the climate for private foreign investments. Allowed more
time, and the right type of encouragement the Centre may still live up to
the dream that its creators envisaged.
ings by the Secretariat (Additional Facility Rules) (1978), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCAL ARBTrATION 110 (C. Schinitthoff ed. 1980). For commentary on the Additional
Facility Rules see Broches, The 'Additional Facility' of the Investment Disputes (ICSID), 4
Y.B. CoM. ARB. 373 (1979) (International Council for Commercial Arbitration).
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